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fter years of intense negotiations between the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic, 
the new US administration has decided to scrap the controversial Bush-era plans for a missile 
defence shield in Central Europe. Foreign policy experts already saw the writing on the wall: 
President Barack Obama launched an in-depth review of the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile 
programme soon after his inauguration, and the Kremlin leaked information back in February that the 
new US administration was approaching Moscow with an offer to scrap missile defence in return for 
greater Russian cooperation on Iran. 
Abandoning the initial plan of ten ground-based missile interceptors in Poland and one radar site in the 
Czech Republic, Washington is instead opting for a new comprehensive missile defence system 
employing cruisers and destroyers equipped with sophisticated Aegis radars and anti-missile 
interceptors in the North Sea and eastern Mediterranean in order to take down short- and medium-
range Iranian missiles. According to official sources, this new system will be more advantageous as it 
will be deployed sooner, consist of more interceptors in more places, and will employ proven 
technology. 
But these are not the only drivers behind this sudden volte-face. First, this fundamental shift in 
American foreign policy is in harmony with the US desire to ‘reset’ its relationship with Russia. It 
removes a significant bone of contention that stood in the way of an agreement on nuclear 
disarmament, which is of particular relevance in the context of the upcoming expiration of the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) this December. Second, it can potentially increase 
diplomatic pressure on Iran by compelling Moscow to close ranks with the West. This is particularly 
important now given the fact that a second uranium enrichment site has been exposed in an 
underground tunnel complex near the city of Qom. Forcing Moscow’s hand on Iran in favour of 
Washington could also potentially weaken Beijing’s opposition as it might be averse to remaining 
isolated on the UN Security Council. Third, the US decision brings to a close deep NATO divisions 
over this issue, allowing the alliance to move forward and explore a new basis for its relationship with 
Moscow under its new Secretary-General. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that the new anti-missile 
system would also save resources at a time when the pressures of the financial and economic crisis are 
catapulting the US national debt to historic proportions (over $11 trillion). 
Whether Washington’s policy reversal will indeed bring political dividends from Moscow that will 
ultimately lead to progress on Iran remains to be seen. Not only might the Kremlin’s influence on 
Iranian policy-making be over-estimated, it is also unclear to what extent Russia would be prepared to 
cooperate; the Kremlin continues to see world politics as a Manichean contest in which a concession 
by one state is considered a weakness and a demonstration of one’s own strength. Russia's willingness 
to move and contribute to a resetting of relations has yet to be demonstrated. 
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In the meantime, while Obama’s missile U-turn might alleviate Western Europe’s anxieties over the 
initial proposal, it has left Warsaw and Prague out in the cold. Obama’s announcement on 17 
September, 60 years after the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union, has even been labelled by some 
Czech media as a second ‘Munich agreement’, in reference to the 1938 pact that led to the annexation 
of the Czech Republic by Nazi Germany. While such comparisons are evidently absurd, they do, to 
some extent, reflect Central and Eastern European security concerns. In the wake of the Georgia war 
and the European gas crisis, there has been a growing sense of uneasiness in the region. As Russian 
assertiveness has increased, Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments’ faith in NATO 
security guarantees and European solidarity has steadily eroded. A long list of former CEE statesmen, 
including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, brought home this point last summer with an open letter to 
US President Barack Obama, in which they declared that NATO seems weaker and less relevant than 
ever before. Ten years after joining NATO, the region still lacks any proper Article 5 defence planning 
or any significant NATO infrastructure, aside from the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) located in 
Poland. According to Ron Asmus, Executive Director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center at the 
German Marshall Fund, Washington also promised Poland a NATO corps-size reinforcement 
capability in the 1990s, but this has yet to materialise. The fact that the European Union has shown 
little support for Central and Eastern European disputes with Russia has further diminished their 
confidence in the EU. 
Faced with an incomplete NATO military infrastructure in their region and an EU common foreign 
and security policy still in its infancy, it is not surprising that Central and Eastern European countries 
have sought to strengthen their own safety by tying the US closer into their security structure. Hosting 
a tracking radar or interceptors would have done the job, providing Poland and the Czech Republic 
with a permanent presence of American ground troops. 
US disengagement from the original missile defence shield has thrown these plans into disarray, 
exacerbating Central and Eastern Europeans’ existing security concerns and giving the impression that 
Washington’s desire to improve its relations with Russia comes at the expense of their own security. 
In the eyes of many, Poland and the Czech Republic have been cast aside as expendable pawns on the 
Eurasian grand chessboard. Their unfortunate status as collateral damage is decreasing confidence – 
not only amongst their foreign policy-makers but also the general public – in the United States. 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs in particular must feel especially demoralised, having hedged their bets 
on the US as their primary security anchor. 
Increasing the NATO or indeed a US presence would go a long way towards addressing these 
questions. Having been promised a Patriot Missile Defence System, Poland could also receive rotating 
Europe-bound American Patriot Units for month-long training tours as is currently discussed. This 
could at some point lead towards a more permanent presence.  
Simultaneously, the Central and Eastern European countries’ current disillusionment with the United 
States could lead to a return to Europe. Some of these seeds might ironically have been sown during 
the tumultuous Czech EU Presidency. While Prague’s six-month stint at the helm was anything but 
smooth, it did provide the Czech Republic with a greater appreciation of the European Union 
illustrated by the simple fact that former Prime Minister Topolanek changed tack on the Lisbon 
Treaty, which he initially vigorously opposed.  
Whether such a genuine return to Europe takes place, however, also depends on Western European 
governments that have traditionally tended to belittle Central and Eastern Europe. Germany has a 
particularly important role to play in this context, due to its close relationship with Russia. With the 
end of the grand coalition and a new conservative-liberal administration, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
can refocus her efforts on Central and Eastern European concerns as promised in the last federal 
electoral campaign in 2005. 
Obama’s new missile defence system not only engages Russia but to some extent also recommits the 
United States to Europe, marking a sharp departure from the Bush strategy of dividing the continent 
into ‘old’ and ‘new’ blocs. Central and Eastern European governments must use this window to 
strengthen their commitment to the European Union and the Lisbon Treaty. In turn, Western Europe, 
particularly Germany, must learn to better take into account their fellow member states’ concerns and 
apprehensions rather than dismissing their unease as outdated historical paranoia. 
